We study the problem of allocating students to projects, where both students and lecturers have preferences over projects, and both projects and lecturers have capacities. In this context we seek a stable matching of students to projects, which respects these preference and capacity constraints. Here, the stability definition generalises the corresponding notion in the context of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem. We show that stable matchings can have different sizes, which motivates max-spa-p, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching. We prove that max-spa-p is NP-hard and not approximable within δ, for some δ > 1, unless P=NP. On the other hand, we give an approximation algorithm with a performance guarantee of 2 for max-spa-p.
Introduction
As part of the senior level of many undergraduate degree courses, students are required to undertake some form of project work. Typically the available projects are advertised to the students, and having browsed through the descriptions, each student (either explicitly or implicitly) forms a preference list over the projects that he/she finds acceptable. Lecturers may also have preferences over the students and/or the projects that they offer. There may also be upper bounds on the number of students that can be assigned to a particular project, and the number of students that a given lecturer is willing to supervise.
We refer to the problem of assigning students to projects subject to these preference lists and capacity constraints as the Student-Project Allocation problem (spa).
Given the large numbers of students that are typically involved in such applications, there is a growing interest in automating the process of allocating students to projects using centralised matching schemes that incorporate efficient algorithms for spa. Examples of such automated systems are in use at the Department of Computer Science, University of York [4, 9, 13] , the University of Southampton [3, 8] and elsewhere [12] .
spa is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem (hr) [5, 6] which has applications to the annual match of graduating medical students (or residents) to their first hospital posts in a number of countries [11] . In the US, for example, the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) deals with the allocation of some 31,000 medical students annually. The NRMP utilises an algorithm that essentially solves an extension of hr, forming a stable matching of residents to hospitals, taking into account hospital capacities, and the preferences of residents over hospitals and vice versa. Informally, a matching guarantees that no resident is assigned to more than one hospital, and no hospital is assigned more residents than its capacity, whilst the concept of stability ensures that no resident and hospital who are not matched together would rather be assigned to each other than remain with their current assignees. Such a pair could improve their situations by coming to a private arrangement outside of the matching, undermining its integrity. It has been convincingly argued [11] that, when preference lists exist on both sides of a two-sided matching market (for example involving residents and hospitals, or students and lecturers), the key property that a matching should satisfy is that of stability.
Stable matchings in the context of spa have been considered previously. In [1] , a model for spa was introduced in which students have preferences over projects, whilst lecturers have preferences over students. A linear-time algorithm for finding a stable matching of students to projects in this context was described, in terms of a stability definition that is a natural generalisation of stability in the context of hr. This algorithm constructs the student-optimal stable matching, in which each student obtains the best project that he/she could obtain in any stable matching. A second linear-time algorithm [2] finds the lecturer-optimal stable matching, in which each lecturer obtains the best (in a precise sense) set of students that he/she could obtain in any stable matching.
In some cases, neither lecturers nor students find it desirable that lecturers should form preference lists over students. For example, if such lists are derived largely on the basis of academic merit, then students who have performed poorly in previous examinations are less likely to be assigned to preferable projects if these projects are popular, and could therefore struggle to improve their academic performance. However, often it is the case that lecturers have tangible preferences over the projects that they offer. For example, a lecturer may strongly prefer to supervise a particular project if it is closely connected with his research. In this paper we consider the variant of spa in which lecturers rank in strict order of preference the projects that they offer. Under this condition, implicitly each lecturer is indifferent among those students who find acceptable a given project that he/she offers.
Our contribution is as follows. In Section 2 we give a formal definition of the variant of spa in which lecturers have preferences over projects, which we refer to as spa-p, formulating an appropriate stability definition in this context. A stable
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matching M guarantees that (i) no student and lecturer could improve relative to M by forming a private arrangement involving some project, and (ii) no coalition of students could permute their assigned projects in M so as to improve their allocation. We show that, in a given instance of spa-p, stable matchings can have different sizes. In most practical situations we seek to allocate as many students to projects as possible, and this motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching (henceforth a maximum stable matching). In Section 3 we show that this problem is NP-hard and not approximable within δ, for some δ > 1, unless P=NP. The result holds even in the special case that each project and lecturer can accommodate only one student, and each person's preference list is of bounded length. However in Section 4, we give an approximation algorithm for the problem that admits a performance guarantee of 2. This algorithm also demonstrates that every instance of spa-p admits at least one stable matching. Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. We remark that spa-p is an example of a matching problem in which the members of two sets of entities (namely the students and lecturers) each have preferences over the members of a common third entity (namely the projects). As far as we are aware, spa-p is the first matching problem of this type to be considered in the literature. The previous formulations of spa to have been considered either do not permit lecturer preferences [10, 12, 3, 8] (so stability is not relevant in these contexts) or involve lecturer preferences over students [4, 9, 1, 13, 2] .
Definition of spa-p
We begin by defining an instance of spa-p, the Student-Project Allocation problem with preferences over Projects. An instance of spa-p involves a set S of students, a set P of projects, and a set L of lecturers. Each lecturer l k ∈ L offers a set of projects, denoted by P k . We assume that P 1 , . . . , P q partitions P, where q = |L|, so that each project is offered by a unique lecturer. Also, each student s i ∈ S has an acceptable set of projects A i ⊆ P. Moreover s i ranks A i in strict order of preference. Similarly l k ranks P k in strict order of preference. Finally, each project p j ∈ P and lecturer l k ∈ L has a positive capacity, denoted by c j and d k respectively.
An example spa-p instance with S = {s 1 , s 2 }, P = {p 1 , p 2 } and L = {l 1 , l 2 }, where A 1 = {p 1 , p 2 }, A 2 = {p 1 }, P 1 = {p 1 } and P 2 = {p 2 }, is shown in Figure 1 .
An assignment M is a subset of S ×P such that (s i , p j ) ∈ M implies that p j ∈ A i (i.e. s i finds p j acceptable). If (s i , p j ) ∈ M , we say that s i is assigned to p j , and p j is assigned s i . For ease of exposition, if s i is assigned to p j and l k is the lecturer who offers p j , we may also say that s i is assigned to l k , and l k is assigned s i .
For each r ∈ S ∪ P ∪ L, we denote by M (r) the set of assignees of r in M . If s i ∈ S and M (s i ) = ∅, we say that s i is unassigned, otherwise s i is assigned. Similarly, any project p j ∈ P is under-subscribed, full or over-subscribed according as |M (p j )| is less than, equal to, or greater than c j , respectively. The same three terms are defined for a lecturer l k ∈ L with respect to l k 's capacity d k . A project p j ∈ P is said to be non-
A matching M is an assignment such that |M (s i )| ≤ 1 for each s i ∈ S, |M (p j )| ≤ c j for each p j ∈ P, and |M (l k )| ≤ d k for each l k ∈ L (i.e. each student is assigned to at most one project, and no project or lecturer is over-subscribed). For notational convenience, given a matching M and a student s i ∈ S such that M (s i ) = ∅, where there is no ambiguity the notation M (s i ) is also used to refer to the single member of M (s i ).
A (student,project) pair (s i , p j ) ∈ (S × P)\M blocks a matching M , or is a blocking pair of M , if the following conditions are satisfied relative to M :
3. p j is under-subscribed and either
and l k is full and l k prefers p j to his worst non-empty project, where l k is the lecturer who offers p j .
We now give some intuition for the definition of a blocking pair. Suppose that (s i , p j ) forms a blocking pair with respect to matching M , and let l k be the lecturer who offers p j . We assume that s i prefers to be assigned to an acceptable project p j rather than remain unassigned, so Condition 2 indicates how a student could improve relative to M . We now consider Condition 3. If p j is already full, then l k would not improve by rejecting a student assigned to p j and taking on s i instead (recall that l k is indifferent among those students who find p j acceptable). Thus p j must be under-subscribed. Firstly suppose that s i was already assigned to a project p r offered by l k . In this case l k would only let s i change projects from p r to p j if he prefers p j to p r -Condition 3(a). Secondly suppose that s i was not already assigned to a project offered by l k . If l k is under-subscribed then both p j and l k have a free place for s i -Condition 3(b). Otherwise if l k is full and l k prefers p j to his worst non-empty project p r , then l k could improve by rejecting a student from p r and taking on s i to do p j insteadCondition 3(c).
A blocking pair thus gives a situation in which a given matching M could be undermined. Another way in which this could occur is through the existence of a coalition. A coalition is a set of students {s i 0 , . . . , s i r−1 }, for some r ≥ 2, each of whom is assigned in M , such that s i j prefers M (s i j+1 ) to M (s i j ) (0 ≤ j ≤ r−1, where addition is taken modulo r). That is, the students in the coalition could permute
Student preferences
Figure 2: An instance I 2 of spa-p.
the projects that they have been assigned to in M so as to be better off. Notice that, were such a permutation of projects to occur, the number of students assigned to each project and lecturer would not change. Moreover, since each lecturer l k is implicitly indifferent between those students who find acceptable a given project offered by l k , the lecturers involved in the permutation have no explicit incentive to prevent the switch from occurring. Figure 2 gives a simple instance of spa-p in which the matching M = {(s 1 , p 1 ), (s 2 , p 2 )} admits no blocking pair but does admit a coalition, namely {s 1 , s 2 }. Define a matching to be coalition-free if it admits no coalition. We remark that, in the context of hr, or spa variants involving lecturer preferences over students, a matching that admits no blocking pair cannot admit a coalition of students (or residents), since the lecturers (or hospitals) involved would, by definition of a blocking pair, be worse off were the switch to occur, and hence would not, in practice, agree to such a switch. Define a matching to be stable if it admits no blocking pair and is coalitionfree. It turns out that, with respect to this definition, for a given instance of spa-p, stable matchings can have different sizes, as the example instance I 1 shown in Figure  1 illustrates. It may be verified that each of the matchings M 1 = {(s 1 , p 1 )} and M 2 = {(s 1 , p 2 ), (s 2 , p 1 )} is stable in I 1 . In practical situations, often a key priority is to match as many students to acceptable projects as possible, so this naturally leads one to consider the complexity of finding a maximum stable matching, given a spa-p instance.
Hardness of approximating a maximum stable matching
Given an instance I of spa-p, let s + (I) denote the maximum size of a stable matching in I. Define max-spa-p to be the problem of computing s + (I), given an instance I of spa-p. In this section we show that max-spa-p is NP-hard, and moreover that there exists a constant δ 1 > 1 such that it is NP-hard to approximate max-spa-p within δ 1 . The result holds even if each project and lecturer has capacity 1, and all preference lists are of bounded length.
We prove this result using a reduction from a problem relating to matchings in graphs. A matching M in a graph G is said to be maximal if no proper superset of M is a matching in G. Let β − 1 (G) denote the minimum size of a maximal matching in G. Define min-mm to be the problem of computing β − 1 (G), given a graph G. The following result regarding the inapproximability of min-mm is proved in [7] . We will use Theorem 1 together with the notion of a gap-preserving reduction [14, p.308], which may be defined as follows.
Definition 2. Let Π 1 be a minimisation problem and let Π 2 be a maximisation problem. Denote by OP T i (x) the optimal measure over all feasible solutions for a given instance x of Π i (i ∈ {1, 2}). Let α ≥ 1 be some constant and let g 1 be a function that maps an instance x of Π 1 to a positive rational number. Then a gap-preserving reduction from Π 1 to Π 2 is a tuple f, β, g 2 such that:
• f maps an instance x of Π 1 to an instance f (x) of Π 2 in polynomial time;
• β ≥ 1 is a constant;
• g 2 maps an instance f (x) of Π 2 to a positive rational number;
• for any instance x of Π 1 :
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of Definition 2.
Proposition 3. Let Π 1 be a minimisation problem and let Π 2 be a maximisation problem, and suppose that there is a gap-preserving reduction from Π 1 to Π 2 . Assuming the notation of Definition 2, suppose further that it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances x of Π 1 such that OP T 1 (x) ≤ g 1 (x) and OP T 1 (x) > αg 1 (x). Then it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances f (x) of Π 2 such that OP T 2 (f (x)) ≥ g 2 (f (x)) and OP T 2 (f (x)) < (1/β)g 2 (f (x)). Hence it is NP-hard to approximate Π 2 within β.
We use Proposition 3, together with Theorem 1, to prove the NP-hardness and inapproximability result for max-spa-p.
Theorem 4. max-spa-p is NP-hard. Moreover it is NP-hard to approximate maxspa-p within δ 1 , for some δ 1 > 1. The result holds even if each project and lecturer has capacity 1, and all preference lists are of bounded length.
Proof. Let G (a subdivision graph of some cubic graph G ) be an instance of min-mm. Then G is a bipartite graph, so that G = (U, W, E), where without loss of generality each vertex in U has degree 2 and each vertex in W has degree 3. Suppose that n 1 = |U | and n 2 = |W |. Let U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n 1 } and W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n 2 }. For each u i ∈ U , let w j i and w k i be the two neighbours of u i in G, where j i < k i .
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We construct an instance I of spa-p as follows: let U 1 ∪ U 2 ∪ S be the set of students, where
and S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n 2 }; let P ∪Q∪R∪T be the set of projects, where P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n 2 }, Q = {q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n 2 }, R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n 1 } and T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n 1 }; and let W ∪ X ∪ Y be the set of lecturers, where X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n 1 } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n 1 }. Each project and lecturer has capacity 1. The preference lists in I are shown in Figure 3 . Clearly the length of each student's list is at most 4, whilst the length of each lecturer's list is at most 2. These lists also indicate the acceptable projects for each student, and the projects offered by each lecturer. We claim that s
No project in Q ∪ R can be involved in a blocking pair of M , since each member of W ∪ X is full in M . Hence no student in S can be involved in a blocking pair of M . Similarly no u is assigned in M to either his first or second choice. Also no project in T can be involved in a blocking pair of M , since each member of U 1 is assigned in M . Now suppose that (u 1 i , p j ) blocks M . Then (u 1 i , t i ) ∈ M and p j is under-subscribed. Thus no edge of M is incident to u i or w j in G. Hence M ∪ {{u i , w j }} is a matching in G, contradicting the maximality of M . Thus M admits no blocking pair.
We next verify that M is also coalition-free. Clearly no student in S can be involved in a coalition, since any such student who is assigned in M has his first choice. Similarly no student who is assigned in M to a project in R can be in a coalition. As a consequence no student in U who has his second choice can be in a coalition, since each such student prefers only a project in R. Finally, no student in U 1 who has his fourth choice can be in a coalition, since no assigned student prefers a project in T to his project in M . Hence M is stable. Finally we note that |M | = 2|M | + 2(n 1 − |M |) + (n 2 − |M |) = 2n 1 + n 2 − |M |, and hence s
Conversely, suppose that M is a stable matching in I such that |M | = s + (I). For each r j ∈ R, it follows that r j is assigned either u 
is a matching in G. Suppose that M is not maximal. Then there is some edge {u i , w j } in G such that no edge of M is incident to u i or w j . Thus by construction of M , either (i) (u
Also p j is under-subscribed, and either w j is under-subscribed or (s j , q j ) ∈ M . In Case (i), it follows that (u 1 i , p j ) blocks M , whilst in Case (ii), it follows that (u 2 i , p j ) blocks M . This contradiction to the stability of M implies that M is indeed maximal.
For each {u i , w j } ∈ M , it follows that (u
, r i ) ∈ M . Hence at most n 1 − |M | projects in T are full in M . Also by construction of M , it follows that |M | projects in P are full in M . Hence at most
as G is the subdivision graph of the cubic graph G . Also m = 2n 1 , where m is the number of edges in G. Let n be the number of students in I. Then n = 2n 1 + n 2 .
Let c 0 and δ 0 be the constants given by Theorem 1, such that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the cases β 
Approximation algorithm
The NP-hardness of max-spa-p naturally leads to the question of the approximability of this problem. In this section we present an approximation algorithm for max-spa-p that has a performance guarantee of 2.
Consider the algorithm spa-p-approx shown in Figure 4 , which is an extension of the resident-oriented Gale/Shapley algorithm for the Hospitals/Residents problem [6, Section 1.6.3]. Our algorithm involves a sequence of apply and delete operations to obtain a stable matching that is at least half the size of optimal. At each iteration of the while loop, some unassigned student s i with a non-empty preference list applies to the first project p j on his list. If p j is full, then s i is rejected and p j is deleted from s i 's list. If l k is full (where l k offers p j ), and p j is l k 's worst non-empty project, then s i is also rejected and p j is deleted from s i 's list. Otherwise s i becomes provisionally assigned to p j . If l k becomes over-subscribed as a result of this assignment, then l k rejects an arbitrary student s r from p z , and p z is deleted from s r 's list. Next, if l k is full (irrespective of whether l k was over-subscribed earlier in the same loop iteration), then each project p t that l k finds less desirable than his worst non-empty project is deleted from the preference list of each student who finds p t acceptable.
We will show that spa-p-approx produces a stable matching at least half the size of optimal. Firstly, using the following four lemmas, we prove that the algorithm returns a matching (Lemma 5) that admits no coalition (Lemma 6) and no blocking pair (Lemmas 7 and 8), and therefore the algorithm returns a stable matching.
Lemma 5. spa-p-approx terminates with a matching.
Proof. Clearly the while loop terminates. For, at the beginning of some loop iteration, let s i be a student who is unassigned and has a non-empty list, and let p j M = ∅; while (some student s i is unassigned and s i has a non-empty list) { p j = first project on s i 's list; l k = lecturer who offers p j ; p z = l k 's worst project; if (l k is non-empty) p z = l k 's worst non-empty project; /* s i applies to p j */ if (p j is full or (l k is full and p j = p z )) delete p j from s i 's list;
for (each student s r who finds p t acceptable) delete p t from s r 's list; −− (3) } } } Figure 4 : Approximation algorithm spa-p-approx for max-spa-p.
be the first project on s i 's list. If s i does not become provisionally assigned to p j during the same loop iteration, then p j is removed from s i 's list. If s i does become provisionally assigned to p j during this loop iteration then some student s r may become unassigned; in this case p j is deleted from s r 's list. Hence eventually, we are guaranteed that each student is either assigned to some project or has an empty list. Let M be the assignment relation upon termination of spa-p-approx. It is immediate that each student is assigned to at most one project in M , whilst no project or lecturer is over-subscribed in M .
Lemma 6. spa-p-approx returns a matching that is coalition-free.
Proof. By Lemma 5, let M be the matching output by an execution E of spa-papprox. Suppose for a contradiction that M admits a coalition {s i 0 , s i 1 , . . . , s i r−1 } for some r ≥ 2. In what follows, the concept of a pair (s i , p j ) being deleted refers to the operation of p j being deleted from s i 's preference list during some iteration of the while loop during E. For each j (0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1), (s i j , M (s i j+1 )) must have been deleted during an iteration of the while loop during E. Without loss of generality suppose that the coalition is ordered such that (s i 0 , M (s i 1 )) is the first deletion of the form (s i j , M (s i j+1 )) (0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1) to take place during E. Let p z = M (s i 1 ) and let l k be the lecturer who offers p z . We consider the following four cases (in what follows, all instances of the term deletion point i, for i = 1, 2, 3, refer to the deletion operation commented by (i) in the pseudocode shown in Figure 4 ).
Case 1: p z was deleted from s i 0 's list at deletion point 1, as a result of p z being full during E. Then s i 1 must have applied to p z after s i 0 did, for if not, then s i 1 was already assigned to p z when s i 0 applied to p z . Hence M (s i 2 ) must already have been deleted from s i 1 's list, a contradiction, since (s i 0 , p z ) is the first deletion of the form (s i j , M (s i j+1 )) (0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1). Therefore p z must have gone from being full to being under-subscribed during E. This can only happen if l k became oversubscribed during E, and p z was l k 's worst non-empty project at that point. Thus when s i 1 applied to p z , it follows that p z was still l k 's worst non-empty project, and l k was full. Therefore l k rejected s i 1 from p z , a contradiction. Hence no coalition exists in this case.
Case 2: p z was deleted from s i 0 's list at deletion point 1, as a result of l k being full during E, and p z was l k 's worst non-empty project. As in Case 1, s i 1 must have applied to p z after s i 0 did. Thus when s i 1 applied to p z , l k must have been full and his worst non-empty project was p z . Hence s i 1 was rejected from p z , a contradiction. Hence no coalition exists in this case.
Case 3: p z was deleted from s i 0 's list at deletion point 2, as a result of l k being over-subscribed during E. Then just before the deletion occurred, p z was l k 's worst non-empty project. The remainder of this case is similar to Case 2.
Case 4: p z was deleted from s i 0 's list at deletion point 3, as a result of l k being full during E. Then p z is removed from s i 1 's list as well, a contradiction. Hence no coalition exists in this case.
Lemma 7.
Suppose that some project p t is deleted from a student s r 's list during an execution of spa-p-approx. Then (s r , p t ) cannot block a matching output by spap-approx. Proof. Let l k be the lecturer who offers p t . Let E be an execution of the algorithm during which p t is deleted from s r 's list. By Lemma 5, let M be the matching output at the termination of E. Suppose for a contradiction that (s r , p t ) blocks M . We consider the following four cases.
Case 1: p t was deleted from s r 's list at deletion point 1, as a result of p t being full during E. Since (s r , p t ) blocks M , p t is under-subscribed in M . Hence p t changed from being full during E to being under-subscribed, which can only occur as a result of lecturer l k being over-subscribed during E, where p t was l k 's worst non-empty project at that point. Thus l k is full in M , and l k 's worst non-empty project is either p t or better. Hence (s r , p t ) does not block M in this case.
Case 2: p t was deleted from s r 's list at deletion point 1, as a result of l k being full during E, and p t was l k 's worst non-empty project. Clearly on termination of E, l k is full, and l k 's worst non-empty project is p t or better. Hence (s r , p t ) does not block M in this case.
Case 3: p t was deleted from s r 's list at deletion point 2, as a result of l k being over-subscribed during E. Then just before the deletion occurred, p t was l k 's worst non-empty project. Now l k is full in M , and l k 's worst non-empty project is either p t or better. Hence (s r , p t ) does not block M in this case.
Case 4: p t was deleted from s r 's list at deletion point 3, as a result of l k being full during E. Then l k is full in M , and l k prefers his worst non-empty project to p t . Hence (s r , p t ) does not block M in this case.
Lemma 8. spa-p-approx returns a stable matching.
Proof. Let E be an execution of the algorithm, and by Lemma 5, let M be the matching output upon termination of E. Suppose that (s i , p j ) blocks M . By Lemma 7, p j is not deleted from s i 's list during E. Hence s i 's list is non-empty upon termination of E. If s i is unassigned in M then the while loop would not have terminated, a contradiction. Hence s i is assigned in M and prefers p j to p r = M (s i ). But when s i applied to p r , p r was the first project on s i 's list, a contradiction. Hence, and by Lemma 6, M is stable.
It follows by Lemma 8 that spa-p-approx is an approximation algorithm for maxspa-p. Moreover, using a suitable choice of data structures, the algorithm may be implemented to run in time linear in the length of the given preference lists. The following is therefore immediate.
Corollary 9. Every instance I of spa-p admits at least one stable matching, and such a matching may be found in O(λ) time, where λ is the total length of the preference lists in I.
The next result shows that spa-p-approx has a performance guarantee of 2.
Lemma 10. Let I be an instance of spa-p. Then |M | ≤ 2|M | for any stable matchings M , M in I.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that |M | < |M |/2. Let X (respectively Y ) be those students who are assigned in M but not M (respectively M but not M ), and let Z be those students who are assigned in both M and M . Then
Now suppose that the students in X are collectively assigned in M to projects P = {p 1 , . . . , p s } offered by lecturers l 1 , . . . l t . Suppose that P 1 , . . . , P t is a partition of P such that lecturer l k (1 ≤ k ≤ t) offers the projects in P k . Similarly let S 1 , . . . , S t be a partition of X such that each student in S k is assigned in M to a project in P k (1 ≤ k ≤ t). Now let k be given (1 ≤ k ≤ t) and let p j be any project in P k . Then there is some student s i ∈ S k who is assigned to p j in M but unassigned in M . Hence in M , either (i) p j is full, or (ii) l k is full (or both), for otherwise (s i , p j ) blocks M . It follows that, in M , either (a) all projects in P k are full, or (b) l k is full (or both). Hence
Since no project or lecturer is over-subscribed in M , it follows that, for each k (1 ≤ k ≤ t), The above lemmas lead to the following conclusion.
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Figure 5: An instance I 3 of spa-p.
Theorem 11. spa-p-approx is an approximation algorithm for max-spa-p with a performance guarantee of 2.
To demonstrate that the analysis given in the proof of Lemma 10 is tight, it is straightforward to construct an instance of spa-p such that the algorithm spa-papprox could produce a stable matching that is half the size of optimal. For, consider the instance of spa-p shown in Figure 5 , where S = {s 1 , . . . , s 2n }, P = {p 1 , . . . , p 2n } and L = {l 1 , . . . , l n }. The matching M = {(s 2i−1 , p 2i ), (s 2i , p 2i−1 ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is the unique maximum stable matching, of size 2n. On the other hand, during an execution of spa-p-approx, if the students apply to projects in increasing indicial order, we obtain the stable matching M = {(s 2i−1 , p 2i−1 ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, of size n.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have considered a model for the Student-Project Allocation problem (spa) in which both students and lecturers have preferences over projects. As noted in Section 1, a spa model in which lecturers have preferences over students has also been studied [1, 2] . It remains to investigate algorithmic issues for a more general preference model for the lecturers, involving preferences over (student,project) pairs. Some detailed initial observations regarding this case are made in [2] .
For the spa-p model, involving lecturer preferences over projects, this paper showed that the problem of finding a maximum stable matching is NP-hard, though admits an approximation algorithm, spa-p-approx, with a performance guarantee of 2. In practice, spa-p-approx is likely to construct a stable matching whose size is closer to optimal than a factor of 1/2, nevertheless the question remains as to whether there exists an approximation algorithm for max-spa-p that has a performance guarantee less than 2.
